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Binmore and Samuelson, in ''Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Ž Game,'' analyze a version of the coordinated attack problem Gray, 1978;  . Yemini and Cohen, 1979; Halpern and Moses, 1990 that is known in Ž . economics as the ''electronic mail game' ' Rubinstein, 1989 . See also Ž . Monderer and Samet 1989 . In this version the noisy communication technology is voluntary and costly. The authors show, in particular, the existence of equilibrium in which only one message is sent. They present Ž . an evolutionary stability condition Selten, 1980 that eliminates the equilibrium in which all messages are ignored, and analyze other equilibrium profiles that survive the stability criterion.
Heifetz and Mongin, in ''Probability Logic for Type Spaces,'' use a Ž . logical approach see, e.g., Kripke, 1963; Aumann, 1995 to knowledge theory to give an axiom system that is sound and complete with respect to Ž . the class of type spaces in the sense of Harsanyi 1967᎐1968 . They compare their work to the approach to type space taken in computer Ž . science Fagin and Halpern, 1994 . Lehmann, in ''Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization,'' presents a model for rational decision makingᎏExpected Qualitative Utility Maximizationᎏthat encompasses the Maximin criterion and generalizes expected utility maximization. The properties of this model are studied in the Ž . framework of von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947 . Its main ingredient is the definition of a qualitative order on nonstandard models of real numbers and the consideration of nonstandard utilities.
However, the emergence of the Internet, as well as recent work carried out by computer scientists, AI researchers, and economists, has shown that the spectrum of mutual interest is much broader. In particular, it includes Ž the field of learning in multiagent systems see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998 , for a survey of learning in games from the economics perspective, and Kaelbling et al., 1996; Shavlik and Dietterich, 1990, for . partial surveys on machine learning in AI . Papers on learning in this issue include the following:
Amy Greenwald, Eric J. Friedman, and Scott Shenker, in ''Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations,'' describe the results of simulations of a suite of learning algorithms in network contexts. They explore the extent to which the asymptotic play depends on three factors: limited information, asynchronous play, and degree of responsiveness of the learning algorithm.
Parkes and Huberman, in ''Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection,'' present a new multiagent model for the multiperiod portfolio selection problem; in such a model we have a system of bounded-rational cooperative agents that pool their initial wealth, manage a share of that investment each, and then pool their final wealth. The authors present a quantitative assessment of the performance of their model in simulated stock markets.
The third part of this special issue consists of six papers on mechanism design in a computational setting. This is a new field in Artificial Intelligence that builds itself on the theory developed in economics and both extends and applies it in various ways. This field had been established Ž . before this special issue see, e.g., Varian, 1995 and there is considerable Ž . ongoing work in this area see, e.g., Tennenholtz, 1999 . The papers on mechanism design in this issue are as follows:
Nisan and Ronen, in ''Algorithmic Mechanism Design,'' introduce new ways to deal with the classical scheduling problem using the theory of mechanism design in economics; they also introduce two ideas new to this field: a measure of optimality and a definition of probabilistic mechanism.
Shoham and Tennenholtz, in ''On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity,'' deal with the questions of what a market can compute and at what expense. The authors treat rationality as a computational resource and show that it has interesting relationships with other computational resources, in particular with communication complexity. The authors also describe mechanisms of low communication complexity for information elicitation.
Sandholm and Lesser, in ''Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach,'' define and analyze the equilibrium of a new type of contract that can be implemented in automatic negotiations. They define a leveled commitment contracting mechanism that allows agents to capitalize on uncertain future events by having the possibility of unilaterally decommitting from a contract based on local reasoning.
Wellman, Walsh, Wurman, and MacKie-Mason, in ''Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling,'' deal with the problem of efficient scheduling of time slots. As the ''optimal'' mechanism for this problemᎏthe generalized Vickrey mechanismᎏis not computationally feasible, the authors deal with another mechanismᎏan ascending auction. They use the best-reply dynamic to analyze the outcome of such auctions. In addition, because every such auction results in a vector of prices, one for each good, the authors deal with the general theory of discrete markets that are cleared by prices.
Wurman, Wellman, and Walsh, in ''A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space,'' deal with practical problems in implementing auctions. They present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and differences of many auction mechanisms. This parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify work within the field and uncovers new, potentially useful, mechanisms.
Vulkan, in ''Equilibria in Automated Interactions,'' describes software agents that play games. The author shows that such agents can get more than humans because they are able to prove to each other that they do not use their information. This ''power'' of ignorance resembles that discussed Ž . in Monderer and Tennenholtz 1999 , who describe software agents that can commit themselves not to remember and are therefore able to cooperate in repeated prisoner dilemma-type games.
Other relevant issues that belong to the field of economics and CS are not covered here, for example, the topic of ''playing theoretically simple Ž . but computationally hard'' games e.g., chess . This topic has been exten-Ž sively studied in AI see, e.g., Russell and Norvig, 1995 , for a general . discussion of game-playing in the context of standard AI techniques , but Ž . only recently studied by game theorists e.g., Jehiel and Samet, 2000 . This special issue illustrates some of the existing and emerging connections between computer science and Artificial Intelligence particularly in regard to economics and game theory. These connections build on a shared perspective: dealing with decision-makers who need to make decisions in a potentially uncertain environment and may learn about their environment and interact with one another. Fifty years ago, several of the Ž . founders of game theory e.g., John Nash and Lloyd Shapley and Artificial Ž . Intelligence e.g., John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky were developing their early theories as colleagues in the same research institute ᎏPrince-ton University. During the subsequent years, these fields went their own ways, refining these early achievements. Now, 50 years later, it seems that close relationships between the fields are again emerging. It is our belief that the level of this interaction will continue to increase, leading to significant scientific and technological contributions.
